PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches by Olson, Mary K.
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 2
2009
PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches
Mary K. Olson
Tulane University
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the
Legislation Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary K. Olson, PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches, 15 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 393 (2009).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol15/iss2/3
PDUFA AND INITIAL U.S. DRUG LAUNCHES
Mary K. Olson*
Cite as: Mary K. Olson, PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches,
15 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 393 (2009),
available at http://www.mttlr.org/volfifteen/olson.pdf
In the 1970s and 1980s, many pharmaceutical firms launched
new drugs abroad prior to gaining U.S. approval. Consequently,
U.S. patients often faced delays in accessing important new
medicines. High regulatory barriers to entry, such as a stringent
regulation and a lengthy drug review process, contributed to this
problem. This Article examines the impact of the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), and subsequent increases in the
speed of FDA review, on the likelihood of initial U.S. drug
launches. These factors are hypothesized to lower regulatory
barriers to entry in the U.S. pharmaceutical market. The results
show that increased drug review speed and other reform-related
changes, such as those affecting drug development times or the
probability of approval, have increased the likelihood of initial
U.S. drug launches. Overall, the results suggest that PDUFA did
improve U.S. patients' access to new medicines by encouraging
more first drug launches in the U.S. market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the global pharmaceutical market, patients' access to new medi-
cines often depends on the drug launch strategies adopted by firms. By
* Associate Professor of Economics and Political Economy, Tulane University.
394 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:393
all accounts, the United States should be an attractive place to first
launch innovative new drug therapies, particularly given the size of the
U.S. market and the absence of price controls. Yet, in the 1970s and the
1980s, many new drugs were first launched abroad prior to U.S. ap-
proval.' Consequently, U.S. patients' access to innovative new medicines
lagged behind other countries.2 Many attributed the stringency and
length of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) drug approval
process as the source of the problem In 1992, Congress passed the Pre-
scription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) to help accelerate FDA drug
reviews and improve U.S. patients' access to new drugs. Under PDUFA,
the speed of FDA review has increased substantially.! Changes in regula-
tion may also impact firm strategies about where to first launch new
drugs. Given that PDUFA was introduced to help improve drug access, it
is important to examine the effects of these changes on initial U.S. drug
launches. In particular, to what extent have faster FDA reviews and
PDUFA led firms to target more first drug launches in the United States?
First drug launches are particularly interesting to study because they
are a direct measure of U.S. patient access to innovative new drugs rela-
tive to other countries. Even if new drugs continue to be launched abroad
first, reducing the lag time between the first global drug launch and the
date of FDA approval will improve patients' access to new drugs. Given
the impact that innovative drugs can have on public health, the stakes for
improving drug access are high.6 For this reason, it is important to under-
stand how changes in regulatory policy and the speed of drug review
may affect the likelihood of an initial U.S. drug launch.
A recent study reports that first drug launches among new chemical
entities in the United States increased from 44 during the 1982-1992
period to 156 in the 1993-2003 period, while first drug launches in the
1. See William M. Wardell, The Drug Lag Revisited: Comparison by Therapeutic Area
of Patterns of Drugs Marketed in the United States and Great Britain from 1972 Through
1976, 24 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 499 (1978).
2. See Kenneth I. Kaitin et al., The Drug Lag: An Update of New Drug Introductions
in the United States and in the United Kingdom, 1977 Through 1987, 46 CLINICAL PHARMA-
COLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 121-38 (1989). Their analysis found that the United States lagged
behind the United Kingdom in the availability of new drugs in every therapeutic category. The
greatest lags were observed for respiratory (5.1 years), cardiovascular (3.2 years), central
nervous system (3.2 years), and anticancer (2.9 years) drugs. Id.
3. See Ronald W. Hasen, FDA Regulation of the Pharmaceutical Industry, in HAZ-
ARDOUS TO OUR HEALTH 19 (Robert Higgs, ed., 1995); Kenneth I. Kaitin & Jeffrey S. Brown,
A Drug Lag Update, 29 DRUG INFO. J. 361, 362 (1995).
4. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codi-
fied as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379).
5. See infra Part III.
6. Frank R. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Knowledge-Capital Accumulation and Lon-
gevity, in MEASURING CAPITAL IN THE NEW ECONOMY 237-69 (C. Corrado, J. Haltiwanger &
D. Sichel eds., 2005).
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European Union declined from 260 to 151 during the same time frame.7
Although the overall number of first drug launches are roughly similar in
the United States and the European Union from 1993-2003, the shifts
noted are particularly striking because the European Union also under-
took efforts in the 1990s to help facilitate drug access and reduce
regulatory barriers to drug launch through global harmonization.8 These
trends lead to questions about PDUFA's impact on firms' drug launch
strategies.
Less time spent in the FDA review process can shorten or eliminate
U.S. launch lags, holding all else equal. In addition, quicker FDA re-
views effectively lower regulatory barriers to the U.S. market. Faster
drug reviews allow firms to enjoy longer periods of market exclusivity,
which increases the expected profitability of new drugs.9 Consequently,
higher expected profits for U.S. drug launches may lead firms to target
more drugs for first launch in the United States. However, liability con-
cerns and other competitive market considerations'0 may create
disincentives for initial U.S. drug launches for some drugs even though
regulatory barriers, namely lengthy drug review times, have fallen. The
impact of this regulatory change, relative to other possible determinants
of initial U.S. drug launches, is not clear. Even with faster drug review
times, firms may continue to pursue initial drug launches abroad rather
than in the United States.
This Article empirically examines the impact of PDUFA and the
speed of FDA review on the likelihood of initial U.S. drug launches
among new drugs approved from 1990 to 2001. This study differs from
previous studies of the determinants of global drug launches by focusing
only on the determinants of initial U.S. drug launches and by consider-
ing the impact of PDUFA and faster drug reviews along with other
important determinants." The primary result of this study is that both
faster FDA reviews and other PDUFA-related changes have increased
the probability of initial U.S. drug launches over time. The results sug-
7. See Henry Grabowski & Y Richard Wang, The Quantity and Quality of Worldwide
New Drug Introductions, 1982-2003, 25 HEALTH AFF. 452-60 (2006).
8. See Elaine M. Healy & Kenneth I. Kaitin, The European Agency for the Evaluation
of Medicinal Products' Centralized Procedure for Product Approval: Current Status, 33 DRUG
INFO. J. 969 (1999). The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA)
implemented a centralized procedure for drug approval in the European Union and created
performance goals for the timely review and approval of new products. Id.
9. This occurs since firms typically patent new drugs during the development process
and prior to FDA submission. Consequently, regulatory delay reduces the effective patent lives
of drugs. See Martin M. Eisman & William M. Wardell, The Decline in Effective Parent Life of
New Drugs, REs. MGMT., Jan. 1981, at 18-21.
10. These other considerations include the number of competing drugs in a therapeutic
class.
11. These determinants include several firm and drug characteristics.
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gest that over this period, declining FDA review times have led to a 14
percent increase in the likelihood of initial U.S. drug launches. Other
PDUFA-related reforms, such as those reducing drug development times
or increasing the probability of approval, have also increased the likeli-
hood initial U.S. drug launches 31 percent by the end of PDUFA I and
27 percent by the end of PDUFA II. Overall, these results suggest that
PDUFA I and PDUFA II were successful in improving drug access for
U.S. patients by raising the probability of initial U.S. drug launches.
Part II of this Article provides some background on FDA regulation
of the drug industry and on the regulatory barriers facing pharmaceutical
firms. Part III describes PDUFA and its impact and discusses the factors
that may influence firms' initial drug launch strategies. Part IV presents
the data and methods that are used in the analysis. Part V reports the
study results; and Part VI presents some concluding remarks.
II. FDA REGULATION, ENTRY BARRIERS, AND DRUG ACCESS
The process of bringing new innovative pharmaceuticals to the U.S.
market is characterized by high entry barriers. FDA regulation plays an
important role in creating and maintaining these entry barriers. Firms
must obtain FDA approval before marketing a new drug in the United
States. The process of gaining approval is both time consuming and
costly.'2 FDA approval requires clinical evidence of a drug's safety and
efficacy. 3 There is a multi-stage process used to gather the evidence. It
begins with pre-clinical laboratory and animal studies to ensure that
drugs are safe for humans. Next, firms must complete three phases of
clinical testing in human subjects to learn more about a drug's risks and
benefits and determine whether the drug is effective for its intended
use. On average, clinical trials typically involve between 600 and 3000
human subjects and can take between two to ten years to complete.'5
Once completed, the firm submits a new drug application to the FDA for
review, which consists of all the raw data and clinical test results.
6
12. Studies suggest that it takes eight to twelve years to get a drug from the lab to the
market and costs approximately $802 million (in 2001 dollars) per FDA-approved drug. Jo-
seph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, & Harry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003).
13. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2008).
14. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2008).
15. COMMITTEE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE US DRUG SAFETY SYSTEM, THE FUTURE
OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 36, 37 (Alina
Baciu et al. eds., 2007).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50.
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In addition to the costs of clinical testing, delays in the FDA's review
process also contribute to the high entry barriers facing firms. Long FDA
reviews delay the realization of monopoly drug profits for firms because
new drug compounds are typically patented prior to FDA review. 7 Con-
sequently, long regulatory reviews for patented drug products not only
delay market launch but can also reduce the period of market exclusivity
remaining after FDA approval. Regulatory delay was particularly severe
in the 1980s and early 1990s when the average review time for a new
FDA-approved drug was about 31 months. 8 When one considers that a
new blockbuster drug can generate sales of more than $1 billion per
year,'9 a 31-month reduction in a patented drug's period of exclusivity
represents a substantial cost to firms and a significant regulatory barrier
to entry.
Increases in regulatory delays have hindered drug access for U.S. pa-
tients. Previous research found that stringent FDA regulation contributed
to U.S. drug launch lags in the late 1960s and 1970sf Policymakers'
concern about U.S. launch lags continued into the 1970s and 1980s as
regulatory delay increased.' In general, positive U.S. launch lags indi-
cate that drugs were often launched abroad prior to FDA approval.
Research found that the United Kingdom, a country with comparable
regulation, led the United States in the introduction of new drugs by 27.7
months.23 However, legislative efforts to combat the effects of regulatory
delay in 1984 focused instead on restoring effective patent lives for new
drug products.24 The Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984 addressed some of the
17. Eisman & Wardell, supra note 9.
18. See Mary K. Olson, Managing Delegation with User Fees: Reducing Delay in New
Drug Review, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 397,406 (2004).
19. See Michael S. Rosen, New Data on Blockbuster Drugs: A Clear Measure of Global
Pharma Success, MIDWESTBUSINEss.coM, Aug. 11, 2008, http://www.midwestbusiness.com/
news/viewnews.asp?newsletterlD=-19369.
20. See Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: 1962 Drug
Amendments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049-91 (1973). See also Henry G. Grabowski et al., Estimat-
ing the Effects of Regulation on Innovation: An International Comparative Analysis of the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 21 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1978).
21. In 1979, Congress held hearings on the drug lag problem. See Hearings on the
FDA's Drug Approval Process Before the H. Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Tech-
nology, 96th Cong. (1979).
22. Kenneth I. Kaitin et. al., The New Drug Approvals of 1987, 1988, and 1989: Trends
in Drug Development, 31 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 116-22 (1991), [hereinafter Kaitin et
al., The New Drug Approvals of 1987, 1988, and 1989]; Kenneth I. Kaitin et. al., The New
Drug Approvals of 1990, 1991, and 1992: Trends in Drug Development, 34 J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 120-27 (1994) [hereinafter Kaitin et al., The New Drug Approvals of 1990,
1991, and 1992].
23. See Kaitin et al., supra note 2, at 126.
24. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Waxman-Hatch) Act of
1984, 35 U.S.C.A. § 156 (West 2009) (allowing firms to extend the patent lives of brand-name
drugs for up to five years to offset delay in the FDA review process as long as the total patent
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adverse effects of delay on firms, but did little to reduce the actual
causes of delay in the review process. Hence, delays persisted and most
drugs continued to be launched abroad prior to FDA approval.2
Things began to change in the 1990s with the advent of the AIDS
crisis. AIDS brought new political pressure and urgency for addressing
the problem of drug lag and drug access for AIDS patients, and AIDS
activists aggressively lobbied the FDA to speed up the review of new
AIDS drugs. 6 The FDA responded to this pressure by introducing new
programs to accelerate the approval of new AIDS drugs." Unfortunately,
these programs did not extend more broadly, as regulatory delays in the
review of other drugs persisted. The success that the FDA had in speed-
ing up the approval of AIDS drugs brought new pressure from other
patient groups and the drug industry to accelerate the approval of all
drugs.28
III. THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) of 1992 was passed to
help combat regulatory delay in the review process and improve drug
access.29 The legislation required firms to pay fees to the FDA to help
cover the cost of drug review. ° The fee revenues, which were designed
to supplement existing agency appropriations, were then used to hire
more staff and build infrastructure to help speed reviews.3t In return, the
agency promised to accelerate drug reviews according to a series of
deadlines established in the legislation and to report annually to Con-
gress on the status of meeting those deadlines. 2 The agency was to
review and act on 90 percent of priority drug applications within six
life with the extension does not exceed 14 years); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of
the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 356-59 (2007).
25. See Kaitin et al., The New Drug Approvals of 1987, 1988, and 1989, supra note 22,
at 116-22; Kaitin et al., The New Drug Approvals of 1990, 1991, and 1992, supra note 22, at
120-27.
26. See STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF
KNOWLEDGE (Univ. of Cal. Press 1996).
27. See Sheila R. Shulman & Jeffrey S. Brown, The Food and Drug Administration's
Early Access and Fast-Track Approval Initiatives: How Have They Worked?, 50 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 503 (1995).
28. See Mary K. Olson, Pharmaceutical Policy Change and the Safety of New Drugs,
45 J.L. & ECON. 615 (2002).
29. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codi-
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months and 90 percent of standard drug applications within 12 months.33
The agency was also supposed to eliminate the backlog of un-reviewed
applications within 24 months of the establishment of the user fee pro-
gram. ' PDUFA had a five-year fixed term so that its stakeholders35 could
revisit the program and reassess the agency's performance prior to its
renewal.36 Since new legislation was required to reauthorize PDUFA, this
allowed industry to give feedback on the program and on the agency's
performance. Under this arrangement, FDA would have to show that
they were meeting the review deadlines to justify program renewal.37
At the end of its first term, the user fee program was viewed by its
stakeholders as a success.3" The FDA had gained more resources for its
drug review division and firms had faster drug reviews.39 Data from
PDUFA performance reports to Congress showed that the agency was
quite successful in meeting the drug review deadlines. 40 Thus, Congress
decided to build on the program's success with additional reforms of the
drug review process. The 1997 Food and Drug Administration Moderni-
zation Act (PDUFA II) renewed the user fee program for another five
years and increased user fee revenue targets for the FDA.4 ' The program
continued its focus on decreasing drug review times by lowering the re-
view deadline for standard rated drugs from 12 months to 10 months. 2
However, PDUFA II also introduced extra performance metrics designed
to reduce the period of drug development and clinical testing, which had
changed little over time. A new series of procedural timetables were es-
tablished to schedule meetings requested by industry, to resolve disputes
33. See Letter from David A. Kessler, M.D., Comm. of Food and Drugs, to Rep. John
D. Dingell & Rep. Norman Lent (Sept. 14, 1992), 138 CONG. REc. H9099-100 (daily ed.
Sept. 22, 1992).
34. Id.
35. Stakeholders included doctors, patients, disease-based interest groups, and con-
sumer safety advocates.
36. See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1796 (1996).
37. Olson, supra note 18, at 426.
38. See Anonymous, Prospects for PDUFA, PHARM. EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1996, at 59;
TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT, IMPACT REPORT: USER FEES CREDITED
WITH 51% DROP IN AVERAGE APPROVAL TIMES SINCE 1993 (2000), http://csdd.tufts.edu/
_documents/www/Doc_309_ 18_892.pdf.
39. See Figure 1; see also Olson, supra note 18, at 406.
40. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT REPORTS AND
PLANS, http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/reports.html#performance (last visited Apr. 13, 2009)
(PDUFA annual performance reports).
41. The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
115, § 103, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) [hereinaf-
ter FDAMA].
42. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,653 (1997) (Letter from Donna E. Shalala, Sec'y of
DHHS, to Sen. James M. Jeffords (Nov. 12, 1997)); 143 CONG. REC. H10,886 (1997) (Letter
from Donna E. Shalala, Sec'y of DHHS, to Rep. Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. (Nov. 13, 1997)).
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with industry, to respond to industry questions about study protocols,
and to develop agency guidelines for the industry. 3 In addition, market
incentives were introduced for firms to conduct pediatric studies ("pedi-
atric exclusivity") and a provision was included to allow FDA to accept a
single well-controlled clinical study under certain conditions." Since
clinical studies can take several years to complete, 5 this last provision in
particular had great potential to reduce drug development times.
At the end of the PDUFA II's term in 2002, review time reductions
were observed in both the approval phase and the clinical phases of drug
development. Among the most innovative drugs, new molecular entities,
review times had fallen from an average of 31 months in 1990-1992 to
an average of 17 months in 1999-2001 .46 The average clinical testing
phase among such drugs also declined from a high of 7.2 years in 1993-
1995 to 5.5 years in 1999-2001. 47 It is also interesting that, although
PDUFA performance reports focused on agency actions and response
times, the probability of product approval also increased from 66 percent
prior to PDUFA to 80 percent in the post PDUFA era.48 While no one
disputed the fact that review speed had increased substantially under
PDUFA, concerns about drug safety and industry influence in the review
process created some conflict over the program's renewal.49 However,
these concerns did not derail political support for the program among its
stakeholders.
PDUFA III was enacted as part of the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (2002).50 Drug safety con-
cerns were addressed by allowing a small portion of user fee funds to be
43. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,653 (1997); 143 CONG. REc. H10,886 (1997).
44. See 143 CONG. REC. S12,653 (1997); 143 CONG. REC. H1O,886. (1997); see also
FDAMA § 115(a), 111 Stat. at 2313. This provision introduced the concept that establishing
efficacy does not always require two or more trials. Id.
45. See DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, supra note 12, at 101-42.
46. Kenneth I. Kaitin & Catherine Cairns, The New Drug Approvals of 1999, 2000, and
2001: Drug Development Trends a Decade After the Passage of the Prescription Drug User
Fee Act of 1992, 37 DRUG INFO. J. 357 (2003).
47. Id.
48. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FY 2000 PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL REPORT FOR
THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT OF 1992 AS AUTHORIZED AND AMENDED BY THE
FOOD AND DRUG MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997 4 (2000), http://www.fda.gov/ope/pdufa/
report2000IPDUFA2000.pdf.
49. See David Willman, How a New Policy Led to Seven Deadly Drugs, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2000, at Al; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OF PDUFA FDA AND STAKEHOLDERS MEETING (2000), http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa2/
meeting2000/meeting2000summ.html.
50. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
tit. 5, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
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used for a limited range of post-marketing drug safety monitoring." No
reforms were introduced to address the drug industry's influence in the
FDA process or in PDUFA renegotiations. PDUFA III maintained the
deadlines for drug review times and the timetables for sponsor meetings,
and it further expanded the FDA's interactions and communication with
firms during both the pre-submission clinical testing period and the re-
view cycle.52 The rationale for these changes was that enhanced
communication between regulators and firms during these periods could
further reduce delays in the drug development and product review
phases.53
A. PDUFA's Effect on Entry Barriers
To understand the impact of PDUFA on firms, it is useful to consider
how these regulatory changes affected barriers to entry in the U.S. drug
market. On one hand, PDUFA created new fees for firms to market new
drugs in the United States. In 2007, the submission fee for a new drug
application with clinical evidence was $896,20. 4 On the other hand,
user fees reduced delay in the development process and expedited review
times so that firms could bring drugs to market earlier in their patent
lives, thus gaining longer periods of market exclusivity. An extra month
or two of effective patent life gained by reducing development or review
times translates into tens of millions of dollars for firms.5 Given that
PDUFA resulted in a 50 percent increase in review speed since the
1990-1992 period,56 the return to firms is likely to be even greater. This
suggests that the gains to firms from reducing delay in drug development
and review are likely to far exceed the amount of the user fee. One study
suggests that PDUFA raised the private surplus of producers by $7 to
$11 billion. 7 Hence, the net impact of PDUFA and faster drug review
times is likely to represent lower entry barriers for firms.
51. User fee funding could be used for post-marketing drug safety monitoring of drugs
approved after 2002 in their first 2 to 3 years on the market. User fee funds could not, how-
ever, be used for the safety monitoring for drugs approved prior to 2002 or for long-term
safety monitoring. See 148 CONG. REC. S5,195-204 (2002) (Letter from Tommy S. Thomp-
son, Sec'y of DHHS, to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (June 6, 2002)).
52. See id.; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PDUFA III FIVE YEAR IPLAN 2003 (2003),
http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa3/2003plan/default.htm.
53. U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 52.
54. Some small firms and some orphan drugs may receive exemptions. SUSAN THAUL,
PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FREE ACT (PDUFA): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR PDUFA IV
REAUTHORIZATION, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 11 (2007).
55. Tomas Philipson et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis of the FDA: The Case of the Prescrip-
tion Drug User Fee Acts, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1306, 1308 (2008).
56. See supra note 38.
57. Philipson et al., supra note 55, at 1308.
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Smaller entry barriers can lead to more first drug launches in the
United States for two reasons. First, drugs in the pipeline will move
through more quickly, holding all else equal. Second, more drugs may be
targeted for the U.S. market because of the reduction in entry barriers.
Lower entry barriers raise the expected profitability of an initial U.S.
drug launch and may consequently lead more firms to shift their initial
drug launch strategies from foreign countries to the U.S. market. In both
instances, drug access for U.S. patients should improve.
However, data suggest that there has been a decline in drug and bio-
logic submissions to the FDA in the ten years following PDUFA. For
instance, new molecular entity submissions declined from 44 in 1996
and 44 in 1997 to 22 in 2002 and 26 in 2003.58 New molecular entity ap-
provals declined from 53 in 1996 and 39 in 1997 to 17 in 2002 and 21 in
2003.' 9 While these trends may signal declining innovation and other
hurdles in the road to drug discovery, they also raise questions about the
extent to which PDUFA impacted drug access and U.S. drug launches.
Although U.S. regulatory barriers have fallen, there may continue to be
benefits associated with a first launch abroad for some drugs. For in-
stance, seeking drug approval where a firm's cost of entry is lower can
provide the firm with revenue to help pay for the costs of the FDA's drug
approval process. Also, first launches outside the U.S. may allow firms
to gain more information and data about a drug's effects under condi-
tions of normal use, which may help support its case for FDA approval.
Beyond regulatory factors, other important considerations may influence
the likelihood of initial U.S. drug launches.
B. Other Drug Launch Determinants
Previous research shows that drug launch decisions in global phar-
maceutical markets are influenced by firm and market characteristics as
well as price regulation. 6° A firm's domestic status and past experience
58. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INNOVATION STAGNATION: CHALLENGE AND OPPOR-
TUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS 2 (2004), http://www.fda.gov/
oc/initiatives/criticalpath/whitepaper.pdf.
59. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA FACTS: THE CENTER FOR DRUG
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEW01342/Fact_
SheetCDER.pdf. Total approvals are the sum of priority and standard NMEs.
60. See Patricia Danzon et al., The Impact of Price Regulation on the Launch Delay of
New Drugs-Evidence from Twenty-Five Major Markets in 1990s, 14 HEALTH ECON. 269, 271
(2005); Margaret K. Kyle, Pharmaceutical Price Controls and Entry Strategies, 89 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 88 (2007) [hereinafter Kyle, Pharmaceutical Price Controls]; Margaret K.
Kyle, The Role of Firm Characteristics in Pharmaceutical Product Launches, 37 RAND J.
ECON. 602, 614 (2006) [hereinafter Kyle, Role of Firm Characteristics]; JEAN 0. LANJOW,
PATENTS, PRICE CONTROLS AND ACCESS TO NEW DRUGS: How POLICY AFFECTS GLOBAL
MARKET ENTRY 6-7 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 61, 2005).
PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches
with regulators, in particular, increase the likelihood of a drug launch in
a given country.' Domestic status could be associated with more knowl-
edge about local markets or be indicative of lower regulatory barriers
which produce a home-court advantage for these firms. Firms which
have past experience with a country's regulatory process may face lower
regulatory barriers than firms without such experience." Other research
shows that regulatory policies that restrict drug prices also influence
drug launch strategies. Several studies find that firms delay drug
launches in countries that have price controls.63 While this research char-
acterizes the determinants of a drug launch in general, it does not
examine their influence on initial drug launch decisions. These studies
also do not examine the impact of the regulatory changes associated with
PDUFA on first drug launches in the United States.
The Orphan Drug Act (1983) is another important policy that may
have affected the likelihood of initial U.S. launches of orphan drug
products.6 Orphan drugs are drugs intended for diseases that affect fewer
than 200,000 patients. The Orphan Drug Act strengthened incentives for
firms to develop and market drugs to treat rare diseases.' This Act in-
cluded incentives for research and development in the form of a targeted
tax credit and a seven-year market exclusivity provision once drugs were
approved.66 While the tax credit lowers the cost of developing new or-
phan drugs, the exclusivity provision increases the expected profits of
marketing orphan drugs. Together, these incentives are expected to lead
to an increase in the number of orphan drugs developed and first
launched in the United States.
Given the impact that new innovative drugs can have on public
health, all countries may share an interest in reducing launch lags and
improving drug access for their citizens. Efforts toward global harmoni-
zation occurred in the mid-1990s, concurrent with PDUFA. One example
of these harmonization efforts was the establishment of the European
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) in 1993. This
agency was designed to encourage faster drug launches and improved
drug access in European Union.67 Since these efforts may lower regula-
tory barriers for firms who want to introduce drugs in the European
61. See Kyle, Role of Firm Characteristics, supra note 60.
62. Firms having prior experience with the regulatory process in a country will have
more information and familiarity with that process.
63. See Danzon et al., supra note 60, at 271; Kyle, Pharmaceutical Price Controls,
supra note 60; LANJOW, supra note 60.
64. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
65. See Sheila R. Shulman & Michael Manocchia, The U.S. Orphan Drug Program:
1983-1995, 12 PHARMACOECONOMIcs 312, 314-15 (1997).
66. Orphan Drug Act § 527.
67. See Healy & Kaitin, supra note 8, at 970.
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Union, they may affect firms' initial drug launch strategies, and therefore
U.S. drug access6 Overall, whether PDUFA and increased review speed
improved U.S. patient access to new drugs relative to other countries
remains an important empirical question. If firms target initial drug
launches abroad prior to U.S. approval as they have done in the past,
launch lags will persist. However, if PDUFA creates incentives for firms
to seek more initial drug launches in the United States (because entry
barriers have fallen relative to other countries), then patient access to
innovative new drugs will be improved.
VI. METHODS AND DATA
This empirical analysis examines the impact of PDUFA, drug review
times, and other factors on the probability of initial U.S. drug launch. It
considers all new chemical entities (NCE) approved by the FDA in 1990
to 2001. This period is interesting to study because it includes drugs
submitted both before and after the introduction of PDUFA I and
PDUFA H so that the impact of a changing regulatory environment on
the likelihood of initial U.S. drug launches can be studied. Drugs which
were never approved in the United States are excluded from this study.
The model below characterizes the factors that may be associated
with first drug launch in the United States. Conditional upon FDA ap-
proval, the drug is either initially launched in the United States (Y=I) or
it was initially launched abroad (Y=O). The model below estimates the
probability of first drug launch in the United States (Y=1) as a logit.
69
P(Y=I) = e"/ (J+e fi")
The factors that influence this probability contained in the x-vector
include regulatory factors, review time, PDUFA I, and PDUFA II, drug
characteristics, and firm characteristics.
P(Y=I) = a + fl, review time, + fl PDUFA Ii + 1 PDUFA I
+ /34 noveli + /3, orphan, +f16j drug classl,
+ /3, U. Sfirm, + fis past approval, + /39 trend, + (1)
68. Firms could be more likely to target the European Union, not the United States, for
first launch, given the simplified procedures under harmonization.
69. When there is a dichotomous dependent variable as above, a logit model is appro-
priate for modeling how the probability p of an event is affected by one or more explanatory
variables. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 871-947 (Prentice Hall, 3rd ed.
1997). Logistic regression is a statistical regression model for binary dependent variables. It
can be considered as a generalized linear model that utilizes the logit as its link function, and
has binomially distributed errors.
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Three variables are included to examine the impact of regulatory factors
on the likelihood of initial U.S. drug launch. The variable review time is
defined as the time (in months) between the date of submission of a new
drug application and the date of FDA approval. 70 The coefficient for this
variable, 83,, will measure the extent to which faster drug reviews are as-
sociated with increased probability of initial U.S. drug launches. Shorter
review times imply smaller regulatory entry barriers so that the predicted
sign for this coefficient is negative. Two time-indexed variables, PDUFA I
and PDUFA II, are included to control for the impact of additional re-
form-related factors in the PDUFA era, besides review speed, on the
decision to first launch in the United States. The PDUFA era is divided
into two periods to measure the separate impact of PDUFA II relative to
PDUFA I. Unlike PDUFA I, PDUFA II included several provisions de-
signed to help accelerate the process of developing new drug
submissions. The variable PDUFA I is equal to 1 for drug submissions in
the first fiscal year of the respective PDUFA program (actually, eleven
months, 10/29/92 to 9/30/93), 2 for drug submissions in the second year
of the program (10/1/93 to 9/30/94), 3 for drug submissions in the third
year of the program, etcetera, up to and including 5 for drug submissions
received in the fifth year of the program. To continue with time indexing
in the PDUFA era, PDUFA II is defined as 6 for drug submissions in the
first year of PDUFA 11 (10/01/97 to 9/30/98), 7 for drug submissions in
the second year of PDUFA II (10/1/98 to 9/30/99), 8 for drug submis-
sions in the third year of PDUFA H (10/1/99 to 9/30/00), 9 for drug
submissions in the fourth year of PDUFA 11 (10/1/00 to 9/30/01), and 10
for drug submissions in the fifth year (10/1/01 to the end of the sample
period 12/31/01).
Several drug characteristics are included. The first variable, novel, is
defined by a drug's therapeutic novelty rating assigned by the FDA and
is a proxy for drug quality. This variable equals 1 for drugs that are given
a priority rating of P (indicating novelty) by the FDA and 0 for standard-
rated drugs (indicating little to no therapeutic gain).' Priority rated drugs
are deemed by FDA to offer therapeutic advantages over existing reme-
dies. As such, they may be expected to generate above-average profits,
which could lead firms to target these drugs for first drug launch in the
United States. However, because these drugs are novel, there may also
70. This period includes the time that regulators spend reviewing the application and
the time that firms take to respond to regulator requests for additional information to support
the application.
71. Prior to 1992, priority-rated drugs includes those rated A, AA, or B. Drugs given a C
rating (prior to 1992) indicate little to no therapeutic gain. K.I. Kaitin, Pharmaceutical Inno-
vation in an Era of Reform, 2 CLINICAL J. THERAPEUTICS 730-34 (1995). More information
about the FDA's current review classifications can be found at U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
What Do Chemical Type and Review Classification Code Stand For?, (Apr. 17, 2007),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugsatfda/faq.htm#chemtype-reviewclass.
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be greater uncertainty surrounding their approval prospects and use.
Such uncertainty could reduce the probability of initial U.S. drug launch
as firms seek to acquire more information in global markets prior to
FDA approval.
The second variable, orphan, is defined as 1 for drugs that received
an orphan designation from the FDA and 0 otherwise, and is included in
order to test for the effect of orphan drug policies on the decision to first
launch drugs in the United States. Orphan drug status is designated for
diseases that affect fewer than 200,000 patients . The 1983 Orphan Drug
Act provided for added periods of exclusivity for orphan drug products
in the U.S. market, which should increase expected profits for orphan
drugs in the U.S. market.73 The coefficient for this variable will reveal the
extent to which the orphan drug policies have encouraged more initial
U.S. launches of orphan drugs.
Ten drug class variables are included to represent the therapeutic
categories of the drugs. They are cardiovascular for cardiovascular
drugs, analgesic for analgesia drugs, anesthetic for anesthetic drugs, cns
for central nervous system drugs, infective for anti-infective drugs, AIDS
for AIDS drugs, neoplastic for anti-neoplastic (cancer) drugs, endocrine
for endocrine drugs, respiratory for respiratory drugs, and gastrointesti-
nal for gastrointestinal drugs. These variables broadly control for any
drug class differences, such as the competitiveness of the therapeutic
market in the United States, that may affect firms' decisions about
whether to first launch drugs in the U.S. market. A positive sign of the
coefficient for a drug class variable suggests that drugs in that class are
associated with a higher likelihood of initial U.S. drug launch.
Firm characteristics include two variables. The first variable, U.S.
firm, is a dummy variable equal to 1 for U.S.-owned drug firms and 0
otherwise. Prior research has found that the domestic status of a firm has
74
been shown to influence drug launch strategies . Here, the status of a
firm is determined by the location of its parent company. A predicted
positive coefficient for this variable will measure the extent to which
U.S. firms are more likely to initially launch drugs in the United States.
A second variable will measure the impact of past success with the FDA
on the likelihood of initial U.S. drug launch. The variable past approval
measures the number of prior NCE approvals obtained by the firm in the
sample period. The coefficient for this variable will measure the extent to
which the number of past FDA approvals influence the likelihood of ini-
tial U.S. drug launch.
72. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 360bb(a)(2), 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
73. Id. See also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
74. See Kyle, Role of Firm Characteristics, supra note 60.
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Finally, a time trend variable, trend, is included to control for gen-
eral trends in initial U.S. drug launches over time. Like the PDUFA
variables, the time trend is indexed to the year that a drug application is
submitted to the FDA. The general trend will capture time-related effects
separate from those associated with PDUFA.
A. Data
This study uses data for all new chemical entities (NCEs) approved
by the FDA between 1990 and 2001. NCEs are new molecular com-
pounds not previously approved in the United States, excluding
biologics, vaccines, diagnostic agents, and new salts, esters, and dosage
forms of previously approved compounds." For each drug, the country
and year of first drug launch were obtained from PharmaProjects,7 a da-
tabase maintained by the UK consulting firm PJB Publications. Using
the year of first global drug launch from this source, lags between the
year of first global launch and the year of FDA approval can be calcu-
lated.
Drug-specific characteristics, including, names, drug novelty ratings,
the orphan drug status, NDA submission years, and the review times for
all new chemical entities (NCEs) approved in 1990-1992, 1993-1995,
1996-1998, and 1999-2001 were obtained from published articles."
Therapeutic drug classes for each of the approved drugs was obtained
from the authors of those published articles. Data from firm annual re-
ports for the years used in the study were reviewed to determine whether
the parent company of the firm was a U.S. firm. Past approvals were then
constructed for each firm by parent company.
A total of 333 NCEs were approved between 1990 and 2001, but fif-
teen drugs had missing data." Hence, the analysis is conducted on 318
NCEs for which both country of launch and firm characteristics were
available.
75. See Kaitin et al., The New Drug Approvals of 1990, 1991, and 1992, supra note 22.
76. i thank Margaret Kyle for making the foreign launch data that she obtained from
Pharmaprojects available to me for this analysis. When data on the country or year of first
drug launch from this source was missing, additional data on country of first launch from
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development for the 1993-1998 approvals was used.
77. Kaitin & Cairns, supra note 46; Kenneth I. Kaitin & Elaine M. Healy, The New
Drug Approvals of 1996, 1997, and 1998: Drug Development Trends in the User Free Era, 34
DRUG INFO. J. 1 (2000); Kenneth I. Kaitin & Michael Manocchia, The New Drug Approvals of
1993, 1994, and 1995: Trends in Drug Development, 4 AM. J. THERAPEUTiCS 46-54 (1997);
Kaitin et al., The New Drug Approvals of 1990, 1991, and 1992, supra note 22.
78. Eleven of these did not state the country of first drug launch.
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B. Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the
analysis. Summary statistics were calculated for the 318 NCEs approved
in 1990-2001. Forty percent of these drugs were first launched in the
United States over the entire sample period. Table 2 shows how the per-
centage of first drug launches by submission year has changed over time.
For drug submissions received prior to PDUFA I and approved during
the sample period, 28 percent were initially launched in the United
States. Among drug submissions received during PDUFA I, 40 percent
were initially launched in the United States. For the drug submissions
received during PDUFA II and approved by the end of the sample pe-
riod, 58 percent of the drugs were initially launched in the United
States.79
The mean FDA review time among these drugs was 21 months. Av-
erage review times declined in the PDUFA era. Among drug approvals in
1990-1992 prior to PDUFA, the mean review time was 31 months. For
new drugs approved in 1993-1995, the first three years after PDUFA, the
mean review time fell to 24 months. For new drugs approved in 1996-
1998, the mean review time fell to 16.8 months. For new drugs approved
in 1999-2001, the mean review time was 16.7 months. Thirty two per-
cent of the drugs were pre-PDUFA submissions. Sixty-eight percent of
these drugs were submitted after PDUFA was signed into law. Forty-one
percent of the drugs represent therapeutically novel drugs. Nineteen per-
cent of the drugs are classified as orphan drugs affecting small patient
populations. U.S.-owned firms account for 54 percent of the drug ap-
provals.
C. Lags to FDA Approval
Before moving to the regression results, it is interesting to examine
the lag between the year of first global drug launch and the year of FDA
approval to determine whether launch lags changed over time.80 Figure 2
shows the percentage of drug submissions in pre-PDUFA, in PDUFA I,
and in PDUFA II that have various lags between the year of first global
launch and FDA approval. Lags are grouped into four intervals: 0, 1-2,
3-5, and greater than 6. A lag is coded as zero where the year of first
global launch coincided with the year of FDA approval (i.e., first global
launch occurred in 1990 and FDA approval occurred in 1990) or where
first drug launch occurred in the United States. The second period in-
79. This percentage reflects all the drugs approved by the end 2001, but does not in-
clude the submissions prior to 2001 that were approved in subsequent years.
80. Seventeen drugs had missing data regarding the year of first drug launch and hence
are excluded.
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cludes drugs that have a 1-2 year lag between first global drug launch
and FDA approval. All drugs in this interval were first launched abroad
prior to FDA approval. The third interval includes drugs that have a 3-5
year lag between the year of first global drug launch and the year of
FDA approval. The fourth interval includes all drugs that had a lag of six
or more years between the year of first global drug launch and the year
of FDA approval.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of drug submissions with a zero lag
increased from pre-PDUFA to PDUFA I and PDUFA II. About 40 per-
cent of submissions pre-PDUFA have a zero lag, while 58 percent of
PDUFA I and 75 percent of PDUFA II submissions have a zero lag. The
percentages reflect the increase in first U.S. drug launches. However,
they also reflect an increase in drugs in which the year of first global
launch is the same as the year of FDA approval (lag = year of first global
drug-year of FDA approval). The percentage of drugs having the longest
lags (greater than six years) declined under PDUFA I and PDUFA II, but
did not fully disappear: 20 percent of pre-PDUFA submissions had a lag
of six years or more while only 12 percent of PDUFA I submissions and
10 percent of PDUFA H submissions had lags of this length. Intermedi-
ate lags of 3-5 years also declined substantially over time: 18 percent of
pre-PDUFA submissions had intermediate lags of 3-5 years, while only
12 percent of PDUFA I submissions and only 3 percent of PDUFA II
submissions had such lags. An important effect of PDUFA appears to be
the elimination of such lags. Finally, submissions with 1-2 year lags fell
under PDUFA, but primarily under PDUFA II. About 20 percent of sub-
missions pre-PDUFA had 1-2 year lags, while 18 percent of PDUFA I
submissions and 12 percent of PDUFA II submissions had lags of this
length. It is also surprising that as higher lags diminished, lags of this
relatively short length also fell.
D. Results
Table 3 presents the results from the logistic regression with coeffi-
cients in column (1) and standard errors in column (2)." Results show
that faster FDA review times are associated with an increase in the prob-
ability of initially launching new drugs in the United States. The
coefficient for review time is negative and significant at the 0.01 level.
To examine the magnitude of this effect and better interpret the results,
81. One limitation of the results is that they are right-censored, which means that a data
point is above a certain value, but it is unknown by how much. Drugs that were submitted to
the FDA prior to 2001, but yet not approved by the end of 2001 are not observed or included
in the analysis. This could lead to an overestimate of the effect of PDUFA, particularly in later
years in the sample.
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the average marginal effect is calculated using the partial derivative
method, where marginal effects are estimated for each observation and
then averaged over all observations. This method yields an average mar-
ginal effect of -0.01, which suggests that a one month reduction in
review time is associated with a 1-percent increase in the likelihood of
initial U.S. launch. Since review times fell from an average of 31 months
in 1990-1992 to about 17 months in 1999-2001, the decline in review
times over this period translates into a 14 percent increase in the prob-
ability of an initial U.S. launch.
In addition to the effects of review speed, PDUFA submissions are
associated with an increased probability of initial U.S. drug launch. The
coefficients on both PDUFA I and PDUFA II are positive and significant
at the 0.1 and 0.05 levels, respectively. To better interpret the results, the
predicted probabilities of initial U.S. launch are estimated for the differ-
ent years of PDUFA I and II. This probability P(Y = 1) = eP'x/ (l+e 'x) is
calculated for each observation, assuming a given value for PDUFA I or
PDUFA I. Then, the probabilities associated with each observation are
averaged. For instance, the average probability of initial U.S. launch,
assuming PDUFA I = 0 and PDUFA H = 0, is 0.20, which implies a 20
percent probability of initial U.S. launch prior to PDUFA. This probabil-
ity increases to 25 percent in the first year of the program (PD UFA I = 1),
31 percent in the second year of the program (PDUFA I = 2), 37.5 per-
cent in the third year of the program (PDUFA I = 3), 44 percent in the
fourth year of the program (PDUFA I = 4) and 51 percent in the fifth
year of the program (PDUFA I = 5). Hence, the change in probability of
initial U.S. drug launch increased by 31 percent from year 0 to year 5 of
PDUFA I. Using this same approach to interpret the impact of PDUFA
II, the probability of initial U.S. launch increased 27 percent from the
first year of PDUFA II (PDUFA II = 6) to the fifth year of PDUFA II
(PDUFA II = 10). These results indicate that other PDUFA-related
changes, such as those leading to increases in the probability of approval
or reduced drug development times (primarily under PDUFA II), also
increased the probability of initial U.S. drug launches. In fact, the mar-
ginal effects suggest that the impact of these other PDUFA-related
factors exceed the impact of the changes in review speed.
Two other variables have also influenced the probability of initial
U.S. drug launch over time. The coefficient for orphan is positive and
significant at the 0.01 level, which suggests that orphan drugs are more
likely to be initially launched in the United States. Since this is a dummy
variable, the marginal effect is determined by looking at its effect on the
event probability as above. It is calculated by taking the difference in the
predicted probabilities when the variable is 0 and then changes to 1,
PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches
holding other factors constant. Using this approach, the marginal effect
of moving from a non-orphan to an orphan drug is a 19 percent increase
in the predicted probability of initial U.S. launch. The result may further
suggest that the Orphan Drug Act has also been effective in terms of im-
proving patient access to orphan drugs by encouraging more initial U.S.
launches of these products.
The coefficient for U.S. firm is positive and significant at the 0.01
level, which indicates that drug submissions from U.S.-owned firms are
more likely to be first launched in the United States. The average mar-
ginal effect calculated by the method above for dummy variables
indicates that being a U.S. firm increases the probability of initial U.S.
launch by 21 percent. This result is consistent with other studies that
have found that domestic status influences global drug launch strategies.
There are different reasons for why such an effect might exist, including
more knowledge of local markets and lower fixed costs of entry in the
U.S. market relative to foreign-owned firms.
Two results differ from prior findings. After controlling for the ef-
fects of U.S. firm, the coefficient for past FDA approvals is negative and
weakly significant at the 0.1 level. This suggests that prior FDA approv-
als do not increase the likelihood of initial U.S. drug launch. After
controlling for review speed, the coefficient for novel is not significantly
associated with the likelihood of first U.S. drug launch. This contrasts
with the findings of Professor Kyle, who found that drug importance
(measured independently of the regulator) increases the hazard of drug
launch in a market and increases the number of markets entered by
firms." Her study did not include a variable for the regulatory treatment
of such drugs."
U.S. regulators have tried to accelerate the approval of novel drugs
over time. However, the decision about where to target a drug for first
launch may reflect additional considerations. Although novel drugs are
likely to be associated with increased profitability, they may also be as-
sociated with more risks, which lowers expected profitability in the U.S.
market. A study of new drug approvals from 1990 to 1995 shows that
novel drugs are associated with an increased number of serious adverse
drug reactions compared to non-novel drugs in their two years after FDA
approval. '4 These competing effects may offset after controlling for the
speed of review.
82. See Kyle, Pharmaceutical Price Controls, supra note 60, at 96, 98.
83. Id. at 95.
84. See Mary K. Olson, Are Novel Drugs More Risky for Patients than Less Novel
Drugs?, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 1135-58 (2004).
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Patients in the United States have historically faced delays in access-
ing important new medicines. One reason is that many drugs were first
launched abroad prior to U.S. approval. The Prescription Drug User Fee
Act was introduced with the goal of improving drug access for U.S. pa-
tients by speeding up the FDA review process. Less attention has
focused on how PDUFA may have affected firms' initial drug launch
strategies, an important indicator of U.S. patient access to new drugs
relative to other countries. This Article's hypothesis is that the changes
occurring under PDUFA lowered U.S. regulatory barriers to entry and
hence, led to more drugs being targeted for first launch in the United
States. To investigate this hypothesis, the analysis examines the impact
of PDUFA and subsequent increases in FDA review speed on the likeli-
hood of initial U.S. drug launches in the 1990 to 2001 period.
Results indicate that both increased review speed and other PDUFA-
related changes have led firms to target more drugs for first launch in the
United States. Faster FDA review times from 1990 to 2001 were found
to increase the probability of initial U.S. drug launch by 14 percent.
Other PDUFA-related changes (beyond review speed), such as increased
probability of approval and shorter drug development times, increased
the probability of initial U.S. drug launch 31 percent by the end of
PDUFA I and 27 percent by the end of PDUFA II. Overall, the results
show that the regulatory changes associated with PDUFA improved drug
access for U.S. patients by encouraging more first U.S. drug launches.
What are the implications of these results for consumers? The an-
swer depends on how these changes have affected consumer health.
Improving patient access to innovative new drugs, especially those for
life threatening illnesses, can certainly improve patient health.85 Such
health gains represent an important benefit associated with more first
U.S. drug launches and improved drug access. However, more first U.S.
drug launches may also pose some new risks for U.S. patients as the first
users of such innovative new products. The reason is that less is known
about new drugs when they are first marketed. Typically, regulators and
firms learn more about the actual risks and benefits of new drugs only
after those drugs have been used more widely in the population under
conditions of actual use. With more first drug launches abroad prior to
FDA approval, U.S. regulators may have benefited from the spillovers of
safety information that come from other countries. As launch lags fall
and more drugs are first launched in the United States, this potential
source of drug safety information is eliminated. Research has shown that
85. See Lichtenberg, supra note 6.
PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches
drugs having shorter periods between first launch abroad and subsequent
U.S. launch are associated with increased adverse drug reactions follow-
ing FDA approval.86 The health consequences of more initial U.S. drug
launches on U.S. patients remains an important topic for future research.
86. See Mary K. Olson, The Risk We Bear: the Effects of Review Speed and Industry
User Fees on Drug Safety, 27 J. HEALTH EcON. 175-200 (2008).
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1


























SUBMISSION PERIOD FIRST U.S. TOTAL U.S. % FIRST U.S.
LAUNCHES LAUNCHES LAUNCH
Pre-PDUFA 28 103 27%
PDUFA I 57 142 40%
PDUFA I1" 42 73 58%
*does not include NCE approvals beyond 2001
DEFINITION
Equals 1 if initial U.S. launch, else 0.
Review time (in months)
1 for submissions in 1st fiscal year, 2 for submissions in
2nd year ... 5 for submissions in 5th year of PDUFA I
6 for submissions in 1st fiscal year, 7 for submissions in
the 2nd year... 10 for submissions in the 5th year of
PDUFA II, else 0
Equals 1 for priority-rated drug submission
Equals 1 for orphan drug submission
Equals 1 for U.S.-owned firm
# of prior drug approvals (since 1990)
Equals 1 for cardiovascular drug
Equals 2 for neoplastic drug
Equals 1 for anti-infective drug (non AIDS)
Equals 1 for AIDS drug
Equals 1 for central nervous system drug
Equals 1 for analgesia drug
Equals 1 for anesthetic
Equals 1 for endocrine drug
Equals 1 for respiratory drug
Equals 1 for gastrointestinal drug
TABLE 2
FIRST U.S. DRUG LAUNCHES OVER TIME:
NCE APPROVALS IN 1990-2001
PDUFA and Initial U.S. Drug Launches
TABLE 3:
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR INITIAL U.S. DRUG LAUNCH
Variable Coefficient (Standard error)
Review time -0.06** (0.02)
PDUFA I 0.38* (0.22)
PDUFA II 0.40- (0.19)
Novel 0.32 (0.34)
Orphan 1.05* (0.40)
U.S. Firm 1.22- (0.29)















*statistically significance at the 0.1 level; **statistically significance at the
0.05 level; *** statistically significance at the 0.01 level
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FIGURE 1
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